



**RIPE NCC**

RIPE NETWORK COORDINATION CENTRE

# **RPKI for Secure Routing**

Brief introduction and some statistics

Presentation


**Gerardo Viviers - RIPE NCC**



# About Routing Security


Brief Intro to RPKI

# BGP is Naive...



# Routing Incidents

- **Typing errors**
  - Also known as **“fat fingers”**
  - 2 and 3 are really close on our keyboards...
- **Routing policy violations**
  - Leaks, filtering misconfigurations
  - “We didn’t mean this to go to the public Internet”
- **Malicious attacks**
  - Route manipulation, BGP hijack, BGP DDOS



# If Only We Could Do Something...




# You Can Do Something!



- **Filter Routes** based on:
  - Best practices
  - Internet Routing Registry
  - **RPKI**
- All recommendations from **MANRS**



# RPKI System



# Routing Security using RPKI






Trust Anchors



RPKI repository

ASN **K** is authorised  
to announce  
prefix **Y**




# RPKI Benefits



## Proof of origin



## Cryptographic identity verification



## Route hijacking prevention





# RPKI versus IRR?

- If we compare **ROAs** and **route(6)** objects...
  - What percent of prefixes is in the IRR?
  - How many are covered by ROAs?
- IRR is **not maintained** very well
- RPKI has advantage of **all five RIRs supporting it**






# **Statistics**

To Understand Better

# Routing Statistics Luxembourg




Source: RIPEstat

ASNs: 86


IPv4: 1313

IPv6: 186

# RPKI in Luxembourg




## ROA Coverage



# Neighbour countries comparison



## % of IPv4 covered by ROAs



## Amount of IPv4 address space




# What about Route Origin Validation?

- **Creating ROAs** is only half the job...
- **Comparing against BGP** is the other half!
- This is what **ROV** is all about
- **You decide** what to do with the announcements



# World Stats on ROV




Source: APNIC

# Regional Stats on ROV



Country	RPKI Validates
Netherlands (NL)	71.95%
Luxembourg (LU)	65.96%
Switzerland (CH)	63.84%
France (FR)	56.59%
Belgium (BE)	22.49%
Germany (DE)	5.90%



Source: APNIC



# Few ROAs, Many ROVs

- Address space is being covered by ROAs
- But not all address space...
- **Why not? What are the obstacles?**
- **The goal is to have 100% implementation of RPKI in every network**
- **End result should be a more secure Internet**





# Questions



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